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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 16-1234 
_____________ 
 
NUMAH BARKUE WILSON, 
        Appellant  
 
v. 
 
OFFICER JOEL JEAN, Badge Number 5320;  
OFFICER KYLE SMITH, Badge Number 1782;  
OFFICER WILLIAM FITZGERALD, Badge Number 1134,  
individually and as police officers for the City of Philadelphia;  
OFFICER JOHN DOE(S), individually and as police officers for the City of Philadelphia 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-15-cv-01793) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mark A. Kearney 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 27, 2016 
____________ 
 
Before: AMBRO, SMITH and FISHER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: September 29, 2016) 
____________ 
 
OPINION* 
____________ 
 
                                                 
*   This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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SMITH, Circuit Judge 
 Numah Barkue Wilson filed this civil rights action after Philadelphia Police 
officers arrested him at a protest.  Having failed to prevail at trial, he now appeals the 
order of the District Court granting partial summary judgment in favor of defendant 
police officers on his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for false arrest, the order of the Court 
denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial, and the Court’s 
denial of his request for a particular jury instruction.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm.   
I. 
 On July 7, 2014, Wilson participated in a protest in which he and others from his 
community gathered in front of a Philadelphia Fire Department station to express 
dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Department had responded to a nearby fire 
that claimed the lives of several children, including two of Wilson’s nieces.  Wilson was 
arrested for disorderly conduct, briefly detained, and then released.  He was not charged 
with an offense.  In April 2015, Wilson filed this action against Philadelphia Police 
Officers Joel Jean, Kyle Smith, and William Fitzgerald (hereinafter, “the officers”) 
alleging § 1983 claims for retaliation in violation of his First Amendment right to free 
speech and assembly, excessive force, and false arrest.  He also alleged state law claims 
for excessive force, false arrest, false imprisonment, assault, and battery.   
 Conceding that certain of Wilson’s claims would need to be resolved by a jury, the 
 3 
 
officers sought summary judgment as to Wilson’s federal claims for retaliation and false 
arrest, and his state law claims for false arrest and false imprisonment.  In response to the 
officers’ motion, Wilson dropped his retaliation claim.  In an opinion and order dated 
October 30, 2015, the District Court granted the officers’ motion with respect to the 
§ 1983 false arrest claim because it determined that the officers were entitled to qualified 
immunity, but denied the motion with respect to the related state law claims.   
 The case proceeded to a two-day jury trial in November 2015.  Video of the 
protest, culled from news footage, featured prominently at trial, and various excerpts 
were played during opening statements, closing arguments, and during the testimony of 
several witnesses.  The video contained general depictions of the protest and depicted 
some of Wilson’s conduct.  At one point, the video shows Wilson gesturing and yelling at 
police officers, while, in another excerpt, he can be seen gesturing and yelling at a police 
officer standing in front of the fire station before moving away from the doors to the fire 
station.  Although there is no video of his actual arrest, the video shows Wilson being led 
away by the defendants, as he struggles and screams “murderers.” 
 Three friends and acquaintances of Wilson, who had also attended the protest, 
testified that Wilson had given the police no cause to arrest him, but that the officers 
nevertheless arrested him and “slammed him on the ground,” “pull[ed] his hand, twist[ed] 
it, hit him a couple of times with a nightstick, push[ed] him to the ground, and pretty 
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much dragged him away.”  (App. 115, 117, 150.)1  Wilson testified that he was “pushed 
on the ground and I hit face forward, cracked one of my tooth, then I notice a pile of 
officers on top of me.”  (App. 126.)  He testified that the officers grabbed him and threw 
him on the ground, and that “next thing I know I’m getting hit left and right on my body 
while I’m on the ground.”  (Id.)  He stated that the officers had injured his arm, and he 
denied cursing, screaming, or blocking the fire station.   
 The officers testified and denied the allegations.  They described a “chaotic scene” 
where protesters were “belligerent,” “shouting obscenities,” and “very uncooperative.”  
(App. 135.)  There was testimony that a water bottle was thrown at police officers, and 
that individuals were lying down blocking the fire station doors and standing in front of 
the fire station.  Officers Jean and Smith testified that they heard Wilson “shouting 
obscenities,” but neither could remember the specific language or words that he used.  
(App. 134, 137-38.)  Officer Fitzgerald testified that Wilson was among a crowd of 
people blocking the fire station and “trying to . . . cause whatever trouble they could [so 
that] the [fire] truck [would] not be able to get out.”  (App. 140.)  Officer Fitzgerald also 
testified that he saw Wilson “be unruly and trying to incite the crowd to keep them 
protesting,” and that a supervisor had pointed out Wilson and instructed him to “take 
[Wilson] off the street.”   (App. 140, 141.)   
                                                 
1 On cross-examination, one of these witnesses acknowledged that, as he had testified in 
his deposition, he and Wilson had “disobeyed the request of the officers to move back, 
and . . . continued to move back and forth.”  (App. 151.)  
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 At the close of evidence, counsel for Wilson made a motion under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 50(a) for judgment as a matter of law with respect to false arrest and 
false imprisonment; the motion was denied without prejudice.  Counsel also requested the 
following jury instruction regarding the First Amendment: 
In considering whether there is probable cause to arrest, an officer must 
also consider the rights of the plaintiff under the First Amendment to the 
United States Constitution.  It has long been established that criminal 
statutes such as disorderly conduct may not be used to punish those who 
challenge police authority or otherwise engage in protected First 
Amendment activity.  Mr. Wilson’s right in a democracy to disagree with a 
police officer is fully protected.  The right to challenge official authority is 
among the fundamental principles that distinguishes this nation from much 
of the world.  The crime of disorderly conduct may not be used to punish 
anyone exercising a protected First Amendment right.  While not all speech 
is protected by the First Amendment, the right as a citizen in a democracy 
to disagree with a police officer is not unprotected.  The freedom of 
individuals verbally to oppose or challenge police action without thereby 
risking arrest is one of the principal characteristics by which we distinguish 
a free nation fro[m] a police state. 
 
(App. 26, 155-56.)  Noting that Wilson had abandoned his First Amendment retaliation 
claim, the Court declined to give his proposed instruction.  Although the Court had 
sustained an objection to discussion of the First Amendment during opening statements, 
it permitted Wilson’s counsel to argue in closing that Wilson had merely been exercising 
his right to free speech at the protest, and not engaging in disorderly conduct.   
 The jury found in favor of the officers on all counts.  Wilson filed a post-trial 
motion under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 50(b) and 59(a), renewing his request for 
judgment as a matter of law on the false arrest and false imprisonment claims, and 
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seeking a new trial based on the District Court’s decision at summary judgment and its 
refusal to instruct the jury on the First Amendment.  In an opinion and order dated 
February 1, 2016, the Court denied Wilson’s motion.   
 This appeal followed.  Wilson argues that the District Court erred in granting 
qualified immunity and partial summary judgment to the officers, and that the Court erred 
in denying his motion for judgment as a matter of law and refusing to give his requested 
jury instruction.   
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1343, and 1367, 
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over 
a district court’s “grant of summary judgment and the legal issues underpinning a claim 
of qualified immunity,” Halsey v. Pfeiffer, 750 F.3d 273, 287 (3d Cir. 2014), and 
summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute 
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(a).  We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, 
applying the same standard as the district court.  Graboff v. Colleran Firm, 744 F.3d 128, 
134 (3d Cir. 2014).  In doing so, we “assess whether, viewing the evidence in the light 
most favorable to sustaining the verdict, a reasonable jury could have found for the 
prevailing party.”  Id. (quotation marks omitted).  Finally, we exercise plenary review to 
determine “whether the jury instructions stated the proper legal standard,” and “[w]e 
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review the refusal to give a particular instruction or the wording of instructions for abuse 
of discretion.”  United States v. Leahy, 445 F.3d 634, 642 (3d Cir. 2006) (quotation 
marks omitted); see also Langbord v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, --- F.3d ---, 2016 WL 
4073269, at *20 n.17 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
III. 
 A. Qualified Immunity 
 Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action against any person who, acting 
under color of state law, deprives another of his or her federal rights.”  Wright v. City of 
Philadelphia, 409 F.3d 595, 599 (3d Cir. 2005).  Qualified immunity, however, “protects 
government officials from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not 
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 
would have known.”  Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quotation marks 
omitted).  In determining whether a right is “clearly established,” the inquiry is “whether 
it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he 
confronted.”  Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 202 (2001), overruled on other grounds by 
Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236; Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640-41 (1987) (holding, 
in a case in which probable cause was disputed, that the court should have considered 
whether it was “clearly established that the circumstances with which [the police officer] 
was confronted did not constitute probable cause”).  Thus, an officer is protected from 
liability if he “reasonably believes that his or her conduct complies with the law,” 
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Pearson, 555 U.S. at 244, and qualified immunity “protects all but the plainly 
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 
743 (2011) (quotation marks omitted). 
 Here, the District Court correctly concluded that qualified immunity was 
appropriate with respect to the § 1983 false arrest claim because the circumstances 
“disclose[d] substantial grounds for the officer[s] to have concluded [they] had legitimate 
justification under the law for acting as [they] did.”  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, a person is guilty of disorderly conduct “if, with intent to cause public 
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof, he:  (1) engages 
in fighting or threatening, or in violent or tumultuous behavior; (2) makes unreasonable 
noise; (3) uses obscene language, or makes an obscene gesture; or (4) creates a hazardous 
or physically offensive condition by any act which serves no legitimate purpose of the 
actor.”  18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503(a).  A reasonable officer could have believed that arresting 
Wilson for disorderly conduct was “within the bounds of [an] appropriate police 
response[]” given Wilson’s conduct as depicted in the video of the chaotic protest.  See 
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 208.  Accordingly, because it was not clearly established that there 
was no probable cause to arrest Wilson under the circumstances the officers confronted, 
qualified immunity was appropriate.2  We will affirm the order of the District Court 
                                                 
2 Even if the Court erred in granting partial summary judgment, Wilson could not now 
revive his federal false arrest claim in light of the jury’s finding that the officers did have 
probable cause to arrest him.  While Wilson argues that the standard for false arrest under 
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granting partial summary judgment in favor of the officers. 
 B. Judgment as a Matter of Law 
 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 provides that a district court may grant a 
motion for judgment as a matter of law if, after a party has been fully heard on an issue at 
trial, “the court finds that a reasonable jury would not have a legally sufficient 
evidentiary basis to find for the party on that issue.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a).  Wilson 
argues that the evidence was not sufficient to establish that the officers had probable 
cause to arrest him because the officers were unable to describe specific words or conduct 
attributable to him, and because the conduct the officers described did not rise to the level 
of disorderly conduct. 
 We disagree.  Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the officers, as 
we must, there was sufficient testimony from which the jury could conclude that Wilson 
used “obscene language,” engaged in “tumultuous behavior,” and that he did so with the 
requisite intent to support a violation of Pennsylvania’s disorderly conduct statute.  In 
addition to the testimony of the officers, video evidence depicted Wilson yelling angrily 
at a police officer, and a fellow protestor testified that he and Wilson disobeyed an order 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pennsylvania law differs from the standard for false arrest under federal law (because 
Pennsylvania law requires proof of “willful misconduct”), it is clear from the jury 
instructions and the verdict sheet that the jury found that the officers had probable cause 
to arrest Wilson, which is fatal to both federal and state law claims of false arrest.  The 
jury had been instructed that “[a] false arrest is an arrest made without probable cause” 
(App. 177), and the verdict form required them to determine whether there was a false 
arrest before proceeding to a separate interrogatory regarding willful misconduct.   
 10 
 
of the police.  As the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has stated, “whether a defendant’s 
words or actions rise to the level of disorderly conduct hinges upon whether they cause or 
unjustifiably risk a public disturbance.”  Commonwealth v. Hock, 728 A.2d 943, 946 (Pa. 
1999).  A reasonable jury could have concluded from the evidence at trial that Wilson’s 
conduct risked causing a public disturbance, and that the officers therefore had probable 
cause to arrest and briefly detain him.  We will, therefore, affirm the District Court’s 
order denying Wilson’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial.   
 C. Jury Instructions 
 Finally, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Wilson’s 
requested jury instruction.  Wilson elected not to proceed on his First Amendment 
retaliation claim and proceeded to trial only on his claims for false arrest, false 
imprisonment, and excessive force.3  The Court properly instructed the jury with respect 
to those claims and with respect to Pennsylvania’s disorderly conduct statute; Wilson 
does not contend otherwise.  As the Court recognized, Wilson’s proposed instruction 
inaccurately described the exercise of First Amendment rights as a complete defense to a 
charge of disorderly conduct.  See Startzell v. City of Philadelphia, 533 F.3d 183, 204 (3d 
Cir. 2008) (“[T]he First Amendment is not an absolute shield against a disorderly conduct 
charge [under 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5503].”); Commonwealth v. Mastrangelo, 414 A.2d 54, 
56-58 (Pa. 1980) (rejecting a constitutional challenge to the disorderly conduct statute).  
                                                 
3 Wilson did not proceed to trial on his assault and battery claims. 
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Accordingly, the Court, which gave Wilson broad latitude to argue in closing that his 
conduct was protected First Amendment activity that did not rise to the level of 
disorderly conduct, did not abuse its discretion, or otherwise err, in refusing to give the 
requested instruction.  See United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 156 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“[T]he [jury instructions] should direct and focus the jury’s attention on the evidence 
given at trial, not on . . . ideas that do not sustain a defense to the charges involved.” 
(quoting United States v. Blair, 456 F.2d 514, 520 (3d Cir. 1972))). 
IV. 
 We will affirm the orders of the District Court. 
